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1 Introduction 
  In very broad terms, political business cycle (PBC) analysis concerns short-run govern-
ment behaviour within election dates. It is believed that authorities run economic policy in typi-
cal intertemporal patterns each office term.
1 Theoretical approaches have searched for justifica-
tions of such patterns while empirical inquiries have tested their reliability with actual data. 
1.1  PBCs with local governments 
  By far, economists have focused on central government behaviour and macroeconomic 
data—Frey (1997). This is not surprising since the possibilities of influencing the economy in-
crease with the level of aggregation. In general, central and even regional governments enjoy 
discretionary power over many more policy instruments than do local governments. Monetary 
                                                 
* The authors thank Vasco Santos, Friedrich Schneider and three anonymous referees for insightful remarks, as well 
as the helpful reactions by Pedro P. Barros, Carlo Devillanova, Frédéric Gannon, Andreas Irmen, Rogério P. Leal, 
Jacques-François Thisse, and Robert Waldmann. Comments from seminar participants at the Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology (Zurich), Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Lisbon), and the University of Warwick (Coventry) are also 
gratefully acknowledged. Remaining shortcomings are our own. 
1 A different, historically oriented strand of literature has focused on the long-run interaction cycles between eco-
nomic performance and political systems, seeking ties with the well-known economic history concepts of Kuznets 
and Kondratieff fluctuations. A flavour of this avenue can be found in Soldatos (1994).   2
policy is not a local business and, with respect to fiscal policy, spatial mobility constrains con-
siderably the local autonomy over stabilisation, redistribution and own revenue collection.
2 
  Yet, it is stimulating to think about the prospects of PBC at the local government level. 
All over the world, the last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented trend toward fiscal de-
centralisation—Yilmaz (2001), Inter-American Development Bank (1997), and Ter-Minassian 
(1997)—which has raised the political and economic visibility of local decision-making. Local 
authorities are playing an increasing role in the allocation function of fiscal policy. The provision 
of local public goods is their core economic case. However, cross-country differences abound 
when it comes to the economic breakdown of expenditure. Chart 1 below takes a selection of EU 
Member States just as an illustration of different specialisations. Whilst somewhat balanced dis-
tributions exist, such as in Germany, it is easy to find many cases of local expenditure concentra-
tion. In Belgium, for instance, the allocation seems to rely mainly on civil servant expenditure—
which accounts for 60% of total local expenditure. In Denmark, current transfers show a remark-
able share of 38%, possibly reflecting the typical involvement that Scandinavian local authorities 
have in welfare programmes. In Italy, the largest share (36%) corresponds to public procurement 
for non-durable goods. Investment expenditure plays a chief role in Portugal (40%). 
 






































Chart 1—Economic breakdown of local public expenditure, selected EU countries 
  PBCs on the expenditure side of the budget require the strategic variable to have some 
particular features. It should be an expenditure item having local accountability and political 
visibility. In other words, such an item ought to be an expenditure category subject to discretion-
ary change by the local authority and whose manipulation from one period to another is not con-
strained by serious rigidities; additionally, people’s awareness about these outlays is crucial if 
one expects governments to use them to enhance their idiosyncratic goals. Investment seems to 
                                                 
2 Other factors constrain autonomous local fiscal decision-making, notably scale economies in administration and 
tax compliance costs.   3
meet these requirements quite well in the Portuguese local case. Most local investment is made 
on highly visible infrastructures (1990 shares for illustrative purpose only): roads (30%), sewer-
age and piped water (13%), social housing (11%), schools and sports (11%). The executive 
branch is fully autonomous to set the contents and the timing of the municipal investment plan—
details in Section 2—and this inter-year flexibility is almost impossible with major current ex-
penditure categories. In fact, the latter are rigid and exogenous with respect to local decision-
making: there are no welfare outlays, public jobs are highly protected by national law and wages 
are set by the central government. 
  En passant, we should note that ideologically-motivated PBCs are far less likely at the 
local level than at the central or even the regional government level. When discretion exists only 
over one or two expenditure categories, there is no scope for the typical right-left wing prefer-
ence biases between current and capital expenditure or between social expenditure and taxes. 
1.2  Vote-maximising models and our contribution 
  The analysis in this paper pivots around the foundations of opportunistic PBC modelling. 
It combines a new explanation with an empirical test at the local government level. In the politi-
cal economy literature at large, it is commonly argued that incumbents seek re-election and chal-
lengers strive to reach office. For instance, Kraan (1996, p. 62) has written: “According to the 
dominant view in the public choice literature, the objective function of politicians is the maximi-
sation of electoral votes (…).” A similar remark is made by McNutt (1996, p. 9). This belief has 
indeed spread to the PBC literature. Earlier seminal opportunistic models were recently reprinted 
in Frey (1997) under the suggestive heading of “vote maximising models”.
3 Modern examples of 
PBC models where incumbents aim at maximising their re-election chances are Nordhaus 
(1989), Shachar (1993), Gärtner (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 16; 1990, Ch. 5). 
  We depart from this view to consider explicitly the two states of nature associated with 
electoral uncertainty: to win and to lose. The motivation springs from the fact that political activ-
ity is fraught with risk. Electorally appointed jobs are scarce when compared to the number of 
potential candidates. Under democratic rules, administration positions are subject to turnover 
rates much higher than elsewhere in the economy. Incumbents who fail to be re-elected in gen-
eral have no certain employment prospects in other public sector offices. These women and men 
must find an alternative job in case they fail re-election. It therefore seems quite reasonable to 
expect rational incumbents to bear in mind outside income (that is, income earned outside the 
public sector) when making their fiscal policy decisions.
4 This behaviour looks even more plau-
sible at the local rather than the central government tier since the uncertainty on future political 
                                                 
3 See Drazen (2000) for a fresh survey of the PBC literature. 
4 Pure vote-maximising models have also been questioned from the point of view of office holders’ career con-
cerns—see Le Borgne and Lockwood (2000) and the references therein. Voters follow a cut-off rule according to 
which they re-elect the incumbent if she performs above a threshold level that does not maximise their assessment. 
Contrary to our approach, the focus is not on the trade off between (local) public office and private appointment, but 
rather on the interaction between effort and ability to meet the voters’ cut-off level.   4
appointments is greater for local than for higher-rank politicians.
5 The maximisation of re-
election chances alone impairs the incumbent’s expected utility upon uncertain events because 
one of the feasible alternatives, electoral defeat, is ignored beforehand. 
  Our paper hopes, therefore, to work out the implications of a simultaneous consideration 
of the two feasible electoral outcomes: to be or not to be in office in the following term. Though 
proceeding from an opportunistic view too, we are able to suggest a different explanation for a 
fiscal policy cycle: the incumbent’s concern with her own welfare in case of no re-election. We 
borrow a simple framework presented in Baleiras (1997a) to accommodate the possibility of ex-
ogenous probability shocks and to open the ground for empirical testing. An equilibrium perfect-
foresight model is designed which totally dispenses with any form of irrationality (namely, on 
the part of voters) or the common objective functions (re-election chances). Being well grounded 
in basic microeconomic theory (own-welfare maximisation by the individual agent), our analysis 
provides another foundation for the emergence of PBCs. 
  The outlined model is then applied to a panel data sample of Portuguese local govern-
ments. This application serves a twofold purpose. Firstly, it provides a test on the empirical plau-
sibility of theoretical predictions. The methodology is quite general and can easily be customised 
to other national contexts. Secondly, it creates the opportunity to try to improve the understand-
ing of the Portuguese local finance system. 
  The paper is organised as follows. Section 3 sets the theoretical model. Major features of 
the empirical application, such as sample nature, variable definitions and econometric frame-
work, are explained in Section 4. The main empirical results follow in Section 5. Section 6 con-
cludes. 
2  An Institutional Digest of Investment-decision-making in Portugal 
  Before moving into economic analysis, it seems helpful to describe briefly the institu-
tional set-up behind the model. The local government unit we will address here is the municipal-
ity. In mainland Portugal, the public sector comprises the central government and 278 (275 until 
1997) municipalities—there are no intermediate-level governments. Each year, the municipal-
ity’s executive branch proposes to the legislative branch the local budget and the activities plan. 
The legislative branch votes on both documents but cannot impose any amendment to them. In-
                                                 
5 The difficulty local incumbents face in finding a future political appointment in case of no re-election has been 
documented for the case of Portugal. Mozzicafreddo et al. (1991, p. 45) found that “(…) very curiously, the political 
career of mayors (Presidentes de Câmara) initiates and ends at the local level, rarely holding positions in the cabi-
net, the central administration or in the national bodies of political parties. The only link, with some significance, 
between central and local tiers is the seating at the national parliament before municipal activity—this has been the 
case of 27.3 per cent of surveyed mayors.” These conclusions follow from a survey analysis involving 55 mayors in 
1986 and a case-study approach focusing on five municipalities from 1976 to 1987. Moreover, central-government 
politicians enjoy a lifetime compensation upon exit of (at least an eight-year long) political activity on top of any 
retirement allowance they may be entitled to (the minimum eligible period has changed to twelve years from 1996 
onwards); local-government politicians are not entitled to such compensation.   5
vestment expenditures can only be authorised whenever they are budgeted and framed in the ac-
tivities plan. 
  A wide public investment spectrum is legally foreseen for local governments’ interven-
tion. Municipalities hold exclusive responsibility for promoting investment on particular items in 
the following areas: urban and rural facilities, sewerage and environment, energy, transports and 
communications, education, culture-leisure-sports and housing. Through case-by-case partner-
ship contracts with the central government, the municipality may also invest in other areas along 
regulated sharing procedures. 
  The chairperson of the executive branch (presidente) plays a prominent role in local poli-
tics. Moreover, she is legally assigned protagonist functions as far as investment actions are con-
cerned. Among her exclusive capacities, she is entitled to the right to personally authorise the 
payment of budgeted outlays and the execution of public works framed in the activities plan. In 
other words, she alone holds the power to decide on the timing of local investment actions and 
on the choice of capital goods suppliers. 
3 Electoral  Defeats:  the Rationale for a PBC 
  This section presents the model under which the PBC is driven by the incumbent’s con-
cern with her own welfare in case of electoral defeat or, more generally, no re-election. Follow-
ing the motivation in Subsection 1.1, the model aims to explain the intertemporal manipulation 
of one expenditure category. As this paper tests the rationale with Portuguese local governments, 
the target category is investment. However, the model is fully applicable to other countries under 
appropriate relabelling of the target variable. 
  The PBC is the optimal solution to the fiscal policy problem faced by the incumbent poli-
tician. We firstly describe the underlying assumptions and, secondly, present three theoretical 
outcomes, one by one: intertemporal consistency of the policy-maker’s problem, PBC on local 
public expenditure and a comparative static experiment over the PBC width. 
3.1 Assumptions 
  Consider two time periods, with an election taking place in-between.
6 The model ad-
dresses institutional set-ups where the government does not have the option of calling for an 
early contest. The local government has a multiperiod investment programme whose present 
value is exogenously defined. However, it can set the expenditure timing. Naturally, this choice 
must meet the budget constraint 
     ,  (1)  12 1 gg +=
                                                 
6 This two-period time segmentation is usual in related literature. See, for instance, Lohmann (1998), Dur et al. 
(1998), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Persson and Tabellini (1990) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1988).   6
where   stands for the programme fraction accomplished in period i (i ). In other 
words, the  s denote the (normalised) investment expenditure in periods 1 and 2. For simplic-
ity, there is no intertemporal discount rate.




  An elected politician (the incumbent) runs the government and each office term lasts two 
time periods. The incumbent decides expenditure levels at the beginning of each period. She de-
rives personal satisfaction from her political activity during each period,  , and this function 
is twice continuously-differentiable with 
vg () i
o r  i . The justification for a utility 
term associated with holding office can be traced back to the ego-rent label introduced by Rogoff 
(1990). Explanations for preferring large budgets to small ones, other things being equal, are 
common in the public choice literature—recall, for instance, the leviathan description of gov-
ernment as made by Brennan and Buchanan (1980, Chs. 2 and 7) or Findlay and Wilson (1984).
8 
′ > ′′ < vv 00 , f =12 ,
g   The politician enjoys vg  only if re-elected, which is an uncertain event. We believe 
the incumbent does care as well about the prospects of losing her office in the following contest. 
Hence, this model innovates by looking also at the welfare associated with this latter event. As 
mentioned above, there is an opportunity cost to holding a public office. Instead of being incum-
bent, the politician could be active elsewhere in the economy, either in the private sector or in a 
non-local public sector, and earn income y per period. Let 
2 b
 denote the twice continuously-
differentiable utility derived from the outside income, with  ′ > x 0. At the beginning of period 1, 
the incumbent faces the intertemporal utility function 
x y ( )
     ,  (2)  uv g v g x y =+ + − 12 1 bg bg ππ () ( )
where π indicates the re-election probability.
9 This probability is endogenously determined by 
the electorate’s ex ante assessment of the incumbent’s future performance while in office, which 
we denote by s. So, 
  () () ss π ππ γ ≡= +  (3) 
where  π  represents an exogenous probability component and γ () ⋅  is twice continuously-
differentiable, with  . We further assume  , i.e., the incumbent never runs unop- ′ > γ 0 π() s <1
                                                 
7 The opportunity cost of capital—interest rate—and the concomitant financial discount factor were essential to al-
low for a PBC in many backward-looking models popular in the 1970s. As we are dealing with forward-looking 
expectations, we can set it aside and still explain a cycle. Of course, the interest rate could be introduced in our 
model without changing results qualitatively. Thus, we opted for its exclusion in order to stress what is essential. 
8 Moreover, politicians’ preferences over public outlays underpin the money-metric utility concept of total evalua-
tion function recently introduced by Kraan (1996, Ch. 3) to model the demand for public goods by political authori-
ties. 
9 In many countries, the incumbent accumulates other earnings with the office wage, such as conference and copy-
right fees or returns from financial assets. These earnings are not what we mean by outside income y. This latter 
variable is a labour return in a fulltime activity outside the local government, and so is not cumulative with the office 
wage.   7
posed, and  , where the equality allows for the possibility of no re-candidacy; therefore, 
< − γ () s () s 1
yy =
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 The  outside  income  y is endogenous. The incumbent’s fiscal policy decisions are a signal 
of her competence to prospective employers. The income they are ready to offer her naturally 
rests on the evaluation they make about her political activity performance, s, which is thus shared 
by the electorate at large and prospective employers in particular.
10 So 
     ,  (4)  s )
which is assumed to be twice continuously-differentiable, with  ′ > y 0. 
  Finally, we must define the way voters and prospective employers assess governmental 
choices. Taking g as expenditure on capital public goods, they are naturally pleased whenever 
their provision is increased. Therefore, 
  ,     (5)  g w g =+ 12 bg bg
where   is twice continuously-differentiable, with  ′ > ′′ < ww 0 , 0
g
. This evaluation function is 
forward-looking since people at time zero judge the current incumbent according to what they 
expect her to do in the future. Why would a rational individual ever assign any weight in his vot-
ing decision to what a government has done in the past when what matters to him is what the 
government will do in the future?
11 Note that prospective employers take into account the in-
cumbent’s choice of   in their assessment, a choice the politician will have to make in the post-
election period only if re-elected, even though outside employment takes place in the opposite 
state of nature (non-re-election). We are thus assuming rational players and perfect foresight. 
This, in turn, implies that voters’ interests do influence the incumbent’s choices since the latter 
incorporates the electorate’s evaluation in her decision problem—directly through 
2
 and in-
directly through  . )
12 There are empirical tests asserting the wisdom of this procedure—see 
Levernier (1992) for an application to US state government elections. 
π() s
                   
10 We may take the latter as a random sample of the former, a reasonable and mild assumption. 
11 Naturally, this attitude does not exclude data on the government’s past behaviour from the voter’s relevant infor-
mation set. Further justification for this line of reasoning can be found in Keech (1995, pp. 141-143) and Alesina 
and Rosenthal (1995, p. 3). 
12 A curious interpretation of voters’ rational behaviour is summed-up in three characteristics by Suzuki (1994, pp. 
241-242), regarding the design of macroeconomic political business cycle models: “(the) electorate possesses a 
well-defined utility function in accordance with the structure of the macroeconomic system in which they operate; 
voters have good ideas about the strategic environment of the system and are aware of the possibility that the in-
cumbent government will pursue its own political goals at the expense of public economic well-being; understand-
ing that the way they evaluate the government profoundly influences the formation of macroeconomic policy, voters 
rely on a sophisticated heuristic for their electoral judgements in an attempt to hold the government accountable for 
economic performance.”   8
  An appropriate incentive-compatibility constraint is required to make the incumbent poli-
tician interested in a re-election run. Condition 
   (6)  φ ≡− > vg xy 2 0 bg ()
plays this role. It says the utility from being re-elected, v() ⋅ , exceeds the satisfaction derived 
from the alternative occupation,  . This expression thus states the expected incentive for the 
incumbent to seek re-election; it can be understood as a necessary (though not sufficient) condi-
tion for a re-election run. It would be unrealistic to suppose the sign of φ otherwise as the vast 
majority of incumbents seek re-election if permitted to do so. Technically, a negative φ would 
alter the players’ incentives implicit in our model, thus rendering its solution meaningless—see 
Proposition 2 below. It also seems natural to assume  ∂ g1 ; in words, the lower the pre-
electoral public expenditure, the higher is the post-electoral (feasible) expenditure and the more 
willing to accept a second term in office will the current incumbent be. Thus, by taking the in-
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  To conclude, two further technical assumptions are required if one wants the optimal so-
lution to be meaningful. Basically, we require the incumbent’s utility function   to be strictly 
quasi-concave in   and  , 1 2
13 and will exclude non-interior solutions in the sequel. 
3.2  The optimal fiscal policy problem 
  Under the hypotheses presented in Subsection 3.1, how is local fiscal policy designed? 
The incumbent’s choice of   is trivial. She maximises her own welfare  2  by exhausting the 
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  gg 21 1 = −    . 
  The selection of   is not trivial. The politician maximises her intertemporal utility (2) 
subject to the constraints resulting from the definitions of re-election probability (3), outside in-
come (4), voters’ and prospective employers’ assessment of her performance (5), as well as from 
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13 Quasi-concavity defined for   with π, y and s replaced by their definitions so as to have the politician’s objec-
tive function defined only over the fiscal instruments she controls. 
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  In the pre-electoral period, the incumbent picks   taking into account how her decision 
shapes her subsequent policy option, if re-elected. This is clear if we note that the solution to 
problem (8) is recursively derived and thus constitutes a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of 
the game. We state this first result as Proposition 1. 
g1
Proposition 1—optimum and Nash equilibrium: the optimal solution to the local incumbent’s 
problem before elections is a pure strategy sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of a game played 
by successive policy-makers. 
Proof: see Appendix.    
  Proposition 1 assures us that the backward induction procedure used to solve the dynamic 
fiscal policy game generates a time-consistent expenditure profile no matter who wins the up-
coming elections. In case of the incumbent’s defeat or no candidacy to a new term, the choice 
rule of the subsequent administration regarding   is also to exhaust the budget, exactly the 




choice renders her post-electoral policy option credibly known to both voters and prospective 
employers. 
                                                
  The problem above can also be looked upon as a stage of a multi-stage game where one 
of the players is a composite of successive administrations, the other two being voters and pro-
spective employers. However, stationarity of the stage game, resulting from the assumptions on 
the budget as well as on voters’ and employers’ horizons (two consecutive periods with elections 
in-between), simplifies the analysis considerably by eliminating the need to study the overall 
game. Note also that the incumbent has a pre-commitment mechanism since her pre-electoral 
 
14 The re-election probability is still ruled by function (3). The parameter π  is omitted here just to economise on 
notation. It will play a relevant role in Proposition 3 below.   10
3.3 The  political  expenditure cycle 
  In this subsection, we want to show how a specific intertemporal expenditure asymmetry 
is generated in above. To do that, we must first charac-
terise the optimal solution to problem (8). This characterisation is conveyed by the first-order 
 an institutional environment as described 
condition
16 
  ′ − ′ −= ′ − ′ − vg s v g wg w g 11 1 1 11 b g b g b g b g π() Ω  (9) 
with 
  Ω≡ − − ′ −− ′′ < xys v g s s x yy s () () () () () 11 0 1 b g mr γπ    .   
  The sign of  ) and the derivative signs assumed 
ver the prim  political business cycle in our
model. 
rst-order condition (9) implies a politico-budgetary cycle such that pre-electoral expen-
bg
Proof: see Appendix.    
  So, the incumbent engenders a cycle: at the optimum, gg 12 > . Why? By taking into con-
f losing the upcoming contest and thus earning the outside income, 
incumbent is led to discount future utility from being in office according to her re-election pros-
pre-electoral outlays bear full 
contrasts sharply with the conventional wisdom in the opportunistic PBC literature—see 
                                                                                                                                                            
Ω springs from the incentive condition (6
itive functions. The following proposition states the o  
Proposition 2—the political expenditure cycle: the incumbent’s optimising behaviour captured 
by the fi
diture exceeds post-electoral expenditure  g1 05 > . . 
sideration the chance o the 
pects, whereas her pre-electoral utility is not discounted. Hen
marginal utility, whereas, in contrast, post-electoral expenses convey only a probabilistically dis-
counted marginal utility. As a consequence, she is led to set pre-electoral investment expenditure 
above post-electoral investment expenditure. Summing-up, the concern with her own post-
electoral welfare, by leading to a probabilistic assessment of post-election outcomes, generates a 
cycle. 




Footnotes, continued from previous page 
15 Though in a different policy context, Tabellini and Alesina (1990, p. 40) have pointed out that the time-consistent 
solutions to dynamic optimisation problems similar to ours is indeed the non-co-operative equilibrium of a game 
played by consecutive decision-makers. 
16 Its necessity to describe optimal behaviour is established by the proof to Proposition 2, below.   11
Baleiras (1997a) for details. The cycle is clearly ascribed to the contingent nature of the incum-
bent’s post-election utility that results from her concern with the electoral outcome.
17 
  The two-period structure of the model is not restrictive as far as the incentives to create 
the expenditure cycle are concerned. As pointed out by an anonymous referee, this is not obvi-
ous. After all, in order to solve the incumbent’s problem, i.e., setting  , we would need 
to take future periods (beyond period 2) into account because the politician is not indifferent be-
tween starting the next budgetary period in office and in opposition. Insofar as the former is pre-
ferred to the latter, restricting focus to the budgetary period is inconsequential for our outcomes. 
The Appendix shows the details. 
, 1,2 gi =
g
i
3.4  Re-election probability and the cycle width 
  In typical opportunistic political business cycle models, we would anticipate an inverse 
relationship between the probability of electoral success and the (investment) expenditure cycle 
width. When that probability drops unexpectedly, the re-election-seeker reacts by spending more 
before elections in order to recover popularity, thus widening the cycle.
18 
  In our model, the incumbent is not a pure re-election runner and yet the above relation-
ship still holds. The current subsection aims precisely at showing this outcome. To consider this 
issue, we have to look for the total derivative of   with respect to the exogenous probability 
component 
1
. As will be shown below, a clear conclusion is achieved. We state it as Proposition 
3. 
π
Proposition 3—re-election probability and the political expenditure cycle: the political ex-
penditure cycle does not narrow with declining exogenous re-election probability (dg d 0 1 ).  π ≤
Proof: see Appendix.    
  Under an exogenously given intertemporal budget, an increase in pre-electoral expendi-
ture decreases post-electoral expenditure and thus widens the cycle. Proposition 3 tells us that an 
exogenous probability fall does not shrink the electoral expenditure deviation. 
  This outcome would be the natural response of a re-election seeker, pure opportunistic 
politician. However, our model does not comprehend such a player. Intuitively, note that a fall in 
the exogenous probability of success decreases the weight assigned by the incumbent to post-
electoral public expenditure. In fact, recall the objective function (2). Both g1 and g2 enter the 
                                                 
17 Baleiras and Santos (2000, 2001) extend this model in a number of ways. In particular, they allow voters and the 
business community to have independent preferences. Interestingly, even when both groups exhibit an exogenous 
bias towards “reverse” cycles (i.e., fiscal policies where  ), the latter paper shows that a cycle such as that 
which Proposition 2 predicts is statistically more likely. 
g1 05 < .
18 As Frey and Schneider (1978) put it: “When (governments) are afraid of losing the election, they make an effort 
to influence the economy in order to increase their popularity and hence their chances of re-election.”   12
outside income definition with the same weight. However, a given level of g  pays off a higher 
ego-rent than an equal level of g2 because vg () 2  is discounted by the  ccess probability. 
Hence, a lower probability render the pre-elec  utility even more important than the post-
electoral one. Therefore, the rational incumbent reacts to the probability shock by widening (or, 




  The predictions in Propositions 2 and 3 may not differ from others in vote-maximising 
4  Application to Portuguese Municipalities 
  As an application of the previous theoretical work, we now wish to investigate whether 
models. After all, even within this literature the same cycle has been predicted in different pa-
pers. The underlying reason for the cycle is what distinguishes between them.
19 The same hap-
pens with this paper. We depart from maximisation of vote share to explore the simple idea, so 
far ignored in the PBC literature, that there is life to care about in the event of an electoral defeat. 
Propositions 2 and 3 are indeed ascribed to this idea. 
the proposed structural model helps to understand the actual behaviour of local governments in 
Portugal. Through this application, we also hope to shed light on other potentially interesting 
facts concerning the political economy of Portuguese local public finance. Propositions 2 and 3 
contain empirical implications that make up the basic ingredients to test. The former implies that 
pre-election investment expenditure exceeds post-election investment expenditure. The latter en-
tails a cycle to a departing incumbent that is at least as large as the one induced by a re-election 
seeker politician. This implication perhaps needs a clarification. Consider two alternative incum-
bents, one seeking re-election and the other not. Clearly, the re-election probability is positive in 
the former case
20 and nil in the latter. With the specific probability function we used in the theo-
retical model, it seems natural to differentiate between the two alternative cases according to the 
value of the exogenous component π . Hence, an incumbent not seeking re-election has a lower 
π  than an incumbent standing for the next elections.
21 Note also that the implication from 
oposition 3 discriminates on empirical grounds our rationale from a conventional opportunistic 
model because, in such a model, the incumbent cannot aim at anything other than winning the 
forthcoming electoral contest. We firstly describe the data set and, secondly, explain the econo-
metric framework designed to serve the double purpose above. 
Pr
                                                 
19 For example, the following macroeconomic PBC has been predicted in several vote-maximising contributions: 
output expansions in electoral periods and output contractions in non-electoral periods. However, this very cycle is 
driven by information asymmetry in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 16; 1990, Ch. 5), retrospective voting in 
Nordhaus (1989), and monopoly power of trade unions in Gärtner (1994, Sc. 4.1). 
20 We naturally discard the possibility of an absolute incompetent politician for whom the chances of being re-
elected are simply non-existent. 
21 More precisely, the no re-candidacy case implies π γ = − () s  in equation (3), exactly the lower bound for parame-
ter π . The re-candidacy case implies π γ > − () s .   13
4.1 The  sample 
  We have constructed an annual panel data sample of thirty Portuguese (mainland) mu-
nicipalities comprising five full electoral terms, from 1977 to 1993.
22 In our application, the de-
pendent variable (denoted by y) is total real per capita investment expenditure: if any political 
influence of the kind discussed in Section 3 exists, investment is the expenditure item over which 
that influence is likely to extend with greater significance. 
  The empirical test of Propositions 2 and 3 requires the use of qualitative explanatory 
variables. Given the two-period nature of the incumbent’s model discussed in Section 3, it seems 
natural to define the two following dummy regressors: 




if local elections are held at the end of the current period
otherwise





if the current incumbent seeks re-election and
the current period is pre-electoral
otherwise
23 




24 The electoral schedule introduces an expansionary deviation on investment 
outlays at pre-electoral periods. If   and   enter the same fit, Proposition 2 calls for positive 
estimates of 
x x 2 3
β 2  and  23 +  because a PBC is expected without regard to the outcome of the re-
candidacy decision. However, this decision is expected to make a difference on the cycle width; 
in fact, Proposition 3 implies β 3 0 ≤ , thus ascribing a narrower cycle to a re-election seeker. 
β β
  Due to a legislative change, the first three sample terms (1977 to 1985) are three years 
long and the last two (1986 to 1993) are four years long. The pre-electoral period of these latter 
terms was defined as the election year and the year before; the pre-electoral period of the former 
was defined as the election year only. 
  We have defined an additional political regressor to take into account the degree of po-
litical cohesion within the local government. Although the theoretical model of Section 3 does 
not require this variable, we believe it plays an interesting role in actual policy-making; hence, 
                                                 
22 The universe contains 275 municipalities during the sample period. Missing data precluded a larger set. However, 
the sample covers a wide diversity in terms of population, density, partisan dominance, constituency, and revenue. 
In 1993, the sampled municipalities account for 31 per cent of total (nominal) municipal investment and 26 per cent 
of total resident population. Further data details appear in Baleiras (1997b, pp. 234–237 and 311–333) and are avail-
able from the author upon request. The use of a random-effects panel data model minimises the inconveniences from 
any bias eventually remaining in the sample—see why in Subsection 4.2, below. 
23 Variable   has unit value if the regression equation contains an intercept term. More will be said about the inter-
cept presence below when presenting the estimation method. 
x1
24 Hereinafter, we will denote the parameter associated with the independent variable   as  .  x
k β
k  14
we decided to include it in the current application.
25 In Portugal, as in many other countries, the 
budgetary function is shared between both branches of government but naturally, the intertempo-
ral profile of fiscal policy is a prerogative of the branch empowered with the initiative compe-
tence.
26 Thus, municipal parliaments are not so bothered with intra-tenure investment manage-
ment as are executive branches and their leaders. They do, however, believe in the political value 
of investment outlays. Hence, the members of a local parliament belonging to the president’s 
party naturally tend to favour expansionary plans while their opponents wish to restrain invest-
ment initiatives. To make it clearer: ceteris paribus, we expect municipal investment in any year 
to be higher if the president’s party enjoys an absolute seat majority at the legislative branch than 
when that is not the case. We can test for this hypothesis by defining a new political dummy 
variable, 





if the incumbent's party holds more than 50% of total seats
at the legislative branch
otherwise
  Our expectation is therefore to find a positive estimate of β 4 .
27 We could alternatively 
conceive a continuous measurement of political cohesion, defined by the exact seat percentage. 
However, this seems a rather weaker way of capturing econometrically the likely influence of 
political cohesion. A score under 50 per cent would probably call for a compromise solution with 
other parties at the parliament, thus diluting the expansionary motivation of the ruling party. 
  There is one last explanatory variable we need to define. An economic variable is re-
quired to control the regressions. As the financial environment facing local governments is not 
stabilised along the sample period, we must distinguish between expenditure changes genuinely 
induced by local political considerations and expenditure changes due simply to varying funding. 
Therefore, we should add a funding indicator to the empirical model in an attempt to control for 
political effects. Given their relative size, received capital transfers are a natural candidate—
these grants represent over 60 per cent of capital expenditure during the sample period. We label 
this new variable as  . It is obviously defined in real per capita units, just like the dependent 




                                                 
25 Actually, the fits do improve with the presence of this variable. 
26 This prerogative is indeed legally binding in Portugal. According to the Local Authorities Act, the municipal par-
liament cannot introduce a single amendment to the budget or the activities plan proposed by the executive branch; 
it can only approve or reject the executive’s proposal (no. 4 of article 39). 
27 We have also considered the possibility of interaction between political cohesion and the other dummies. Variable 
24 x x  ( 34 x x
4
) captures the impact of an absolute majority on the cycle width (on the differential width induced by a 
re-election seeker). Yet, we found no empirical support for these interactions. By entering alone in regression lines, 
variable  x  tests for the above time-independent effect of partisan composition on investment expenditure. 
28 As the number of sampled individuals grows to infinity, lagged values of the dependent variable are increasingly 
more appealing as control variables—see Arellano and Bond (1991). Reliance on their use is particularly tempting 
when no sound, natural exogenous variable exists in the application context. In our case, neither of these conditions 
is met, which explains our preference to control the regressions via received capital grants.   15
  To conclude, we should remark on a potential structural break in 1986. Portugal joined 
the European Community as of the 1
st of January, 1986. Its participation in the community re-
gional policy gave the central as well as local governments new resources, the structural funds—
and later, from 1993 onwards, the cohesion fund. These proceedings are matching grants condi-
tional upon the rules of eligibility and additionality that restrict their use to investment finance. A 
large fraction is actually translated into public capital accumulation. Rules of access to these new 
income streams, however, differ quite substantially from those applying to traditional central 
government transfers. In particular, their disposal by municipal budgets is less predictable than 
older transfers (those from the central government) since these newer transfers are conditional on 
the pre-existence of investment programs and, to a large extent, must be bargained with central 
government agencies. The whole transfer procedure is thus longer and contains several critical 
deadlines sharing nothing with local electoral schedules. Therefore, we should suspect that the 
increasing reliance of local governments on structural funds makes the political business cycle 
harder to implement. Nevertheless, the increasing availability of this new revenue, which does 
not crowd out any previous income source, is expected to enhance the power of capital transfers 
to explain municipal investment. Hence, we will divide the sample into two sub-periods, 1977 to 
1985 and 1986 to 1993, so as to formally test the statistical significance of this potential 1986 
break. 
4.2  The econometric framework 
  As is evident from the sample nature discussed above, each variable observation contains 
both an individual and a time dimension. With N individuals and T time periods, the empirical 
model becomes 
     ,  (10)  yx v i N t it k
k
K
kit it =+ = =
= ∑β
1
11 ,,; ,, …… T
where k accounts for the number of regressors and   is the usual stochastic residual. The eco-
nomic variables (y and 
vit
5 x ) are measured in logarithmic units.
29 Sample municipalities are likely 
very different from one another. Population size is not the same across them, their geographic 
location varies, they are ruled by distinct political parties, the personal motivation of incumbent 
leaders is inherently idiosyncratic, incumbents’ competence is unalike and all this diversity leads 
local governments to differ in the way they adjust investment expenditure to common stimuli. 
Clearly, the assumption of equal regression coefficients implicit in (10) does not seem realistic. 
But the problem of finding a better specification is that we do not know for sure what it exactly 
is. Moreover, the wish to add realism must be traded off against the degrees of freedom loss 
when we think about estimation procedures. 
                                                 
29 As there is no theoretical recommendation, our empirical implementation has actually measured real per capita 
investment and real per capita transfers both in natural units and in logarithmic terms. However, for the sake of 
space, we report only the logarithmic case in Section 5 Empirical Results, as its fits are better.   16
  In our quest for a parsimonious specification allowing for individual heterogeneity, we 
decided to reflect inter-municipal differences solely in intercept terms. To be more precise, all 
slope coefficients are assumed to be equal across individuals and the parameter associated with 
 is expressed as  k =1
  β β µ 11 it i it =+ ∀ ,    , 
where β1 is constant and µi is the individual-specific component. Although unknown, one must 
also assume from the outset whether these individual components are fixed or random. 
  The choice between fixed and random effect specifications has been thoroughly analysed 
in the econometrics literature. Following several criteria suggested by Balestra (1992), Hsiao 
(1986, Chs. 3 and 6; 1992) and Greene (1993, Sc. 16.4), we opt for the stochastic version of in-
dividual parameters. Firstly, municipal heterogeneity relies upon a number of non-observable 
random causes, such as access to capital transfers,
30 incumbent’s re-candidacy decision
31 or re-
election probability.
32 Secondly, given that T is relatively small (when compared to N) in our 
sample, parameter estimates in fixed-effect models are less reliable than in random-effect models 
because the ratio of estimable coefficients to available observations is larger. Thirdly, the sample 
is open in the sense that the N collected municipalities are only a subset of the whole statistical 
population of Portuguese local governments. Therefore, individual differences are not a main 
research concern—the focus is clearly on slope parameters. Individual asymmetry analysis 
would become a natural priority if the sample were closed in the sense of covering all individuals 
of the statistical population; in this case, then, a fixed-effects model would be most welcome.
33 
Finally, we would like to use regression results to draw conclusions bearing some significance to 
Portuguese local public finance in general and not only applicable to sampled municipalities. In 
other words, we prefer to make statistical inference with respect to population features rather 
than inference conditional on the effects present in the sample. According to Hsiao (1986, Chs. 3 
and 6) in particular, a random-effects model is the most suitable specification when this kind of 
inference is wished. 
                                                 
30 Access to national transfers relies very much on the central government’s discretion and very little on the local 
governments’ behaviour. The same applies to European capital grants, whose eligibility is contingent upon adminis-
trative contests empowered by the central government and European agencies. Ex ante, these variables are unknown 
to the individual municipality, whose bargaining power is typically too small to exert any noticeable influence upon 
their realisation. Only a collective lobbying organisation encompassing a large enough number of local governments 
may have such power. The reader interested in a political economy approach to municipal lobbying for transfers 
may wish to consult Pereira (1996). 
31 The re-candidacy decision, whose foundations lie beyond this essay’s scope, depends on the incumbent’s personal 
trade-off between the local public and non-local public job offers and we can think of politicians as being sorted out 
from a random distribution of these trade-offs. The concerned reader can refer to Reed (1994) for a cost-benefit 
analysis of re-election runs. 
32 We have not explored in Section 3 the randomness of the re-election probability but we do not ignore its role in 
the real world. See Tabellini and Alesina (1990) for an example of random probability modelling. 
33 The individual-specific terms   should be treated as constants if the performance of the individual units in the 
database were of paramount interest, but that is not our case. The size and magnitude of slope coefficients matter 
more for us than eventual individual differences between them. 
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  It is fair to say the empirical PBC literature has proceeded otherwise. In papers such as 
Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b), Alesina and Roubini (1992), Alesina et al. (1993), and Schuknecht 
(1999, 2000), on the central government tier, and Blais and Nadeau (1992), at the subnational 
tier, the individual idiosyncrasies are modelled as deterministic effects from the outset and are 
not open to discussion. Contrary to this trend, and following the arguments above, we believe 
there are reasons in our statistical population to expect randomness on inter-municipal structural 
differences; therefore, we opt for a stochastic specification of individual effects and will subject 
our choice to the data scrutiny—indeed, a formal test (the Hausman’s test below) will endorse, in 
our case, the superiority of the random-effects approach. 
  Having decided to use a stochastic specification of individual effects on intercepts, the 
appropriate econometric specification is the so-called error-components model. It will be esti-
mated according to the feasible generalised least-squares method. Technical details on both the 
model and the estimator can be found, for example, in Greene (1993, Ch. 16), Mátyás (1992) and 
Hsiao (1986, Ch. 3). 
5 Empirical  Results 
  The main outcomes of our empirical research are shown in Table 1. We ran the logarithm 
of real per capita investment expenditure (y) against the logarithm of real per capita received 
capital transfers ( ) and the political dummies—the electoral variable  , the re-candidacy dif-
ferential variable   and the political cohesion variable  . Column 1
x x
x





34 refers to the total sample 
period, 1977–93, whereas columns 2 and 3 refer to the sub-periods 1977–85 and 1986–93, re-
spectively. Firstly, we shall comment upon the overall results in these columns; secondly, we 
shall address the empirical backup of the PBC rationale. 
5.1 Basic  findings 
  The evidence in favour of the structural break is indeed quite strong. There is a clear re-
gression improvement from 1986 onwards. This is perceived by the individual explanatory 
power of each independent variable and, most noticeably, is reflected in both overall goodness-
of-fit statistics displayed: the absolute error measure given by the residual’s standard deviation 
falls from 0.40 to 0.24 and its relative error counterpart, the coefficient of determination, rises 
almost twenty percentage points. The implicit Chow’s test confirms the significance of the dif-
ferences. The residual sum of squares attached to the post-1986 regression is 3.356 while the 
homologous figure relating to the whole sample period is 16.046; hence, the relevant F-statistic 
is 3.292, comfortably above the 1 per cent significance threshold. Consequently, we should reject 
the explicit null hypothesis, that is, we find evidence in favour of a structural break in 1986. The 
sub-samples are drawn from different populations and should not be merged. At the end of this 
 
34 Columns are numbered from left to right.   18
subsection, we shall comment on the weaker performance of the empirical model in the first sub-
period. 
Table 1—Main regressions 
Independent  Dependent variable:    ln y

















































St. error of 
regression  0.339 0.396 0.238  0.404  0.258 
2 R   0.513 0.379 0.563  0.338  0.513 
Hausman  5.315 1.244 0.907  0.865  3.039 
t-Ratios in parentheses. 
* Significant at 99 % (one-tailed test). 
** Significant at 99 % (two-tailed test). 
*** Significant at 97.5 % (one-tailed test). 
  The first three specifications pass the overall significance F-test, even in the case of col-
umn 2 whose coefficient of determination is only about 38 per cent.
35 Interestingly, in all cases 
the Hausman’s statistic is comfortably located in the acceptance region of the relevant  -
distribution (the critical value for a 99 per cent confidence level is 13.3); thus, the empirical evi-
dence does not contradict our priors in favour of the random composition of individual effects. 
χ
2
  Note the strong explanatory power of the control variable. The elasticity of investment 
with respect to capital transfers increases from less than 61 per cent in the first period to over 67 
per cent afterwards, and this point estimate change is combined with a clear significance im-
provement. This result confirms our expectation about the role of structural funds after 1986. Cu-
riously, the political cohesion variable displays the expected sign and is statistically significant in 
columns 1 and 3 but fails these features in column 2. 
  So the empirical model shows a weaker performance in the 1977–85 sub-period. The 
problems seem to lie with two political regressors,  3 x  and  4 x . Like  2 x , these variables assume a 
democratic background where the people elect incumbents at regular time intervals. However, 
Portugal was ruled by a dictatorship for 48 years, until 1974. Moreover, between 1911 and 1976 
local incumbents have always been appointed by the central government and were accountable 
before the central government only. The first local elections since 1911 were held precisely in 
                                                 
35 Typically, panel data models of government finance exhibit relatively low values for   and display significance 
problems with dummy variables at high levels of breakdown. 
R
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December 1976. This means the political background of the PBC model in Section 3 above was 
lacking in Portugal during the first democratic years. It takes time to learn democracy and to dis-
cover the kind of politico-economic incentives that drive our theoretical model. We thus believe 
that this learning process can be a valid explanation for the somewhat weaker empirical results 
found in the first sub-period. 
5.2  Test of the PBC rationale 
  We can now address the empirical implications of our main theoretical results. Recall that 
Proposition 2 entails β2 0 >  and  23 while Proposition 3 implies β3 0 ≤
x x
                                                
. The estimates 
in all columns 1–3 do comply with these theoretical restrictions—their statistical significance is 
analysed below. During the first sub-period (column 2), leaving incumbents are associated with a 
31 per cent
36 investment jump in pre-electoral years while re-election runners also display an in-
tertemporal asymmetry but of a lesser magnitude, recording only a 12 per cent PBC. Cycles in 
the second sub-period (column 3) are smaller: 9 per cent upward jumps for departing incumbents 
and just 4 per cent upward deviations for re-election seekers. Hence, access to EC’s structural 
grants seems to have reduced the PBC potential and reinforced the role of capital transfers, just 
as expected. 
β β 0 + >
  Chart 2 offers a graphical illustration of the PBC taking the municipality of Viana do 
Alentejo as an example.
37 We opted to represent the sub-sample models only—regression 2 for 
the years 1977 to 1985 and regression 3 for the years 1986 to 1993. The solid line plots the no-
cycle prediction for this municipality, i.e. the fits in columns 2 and 3 without the cycle dummies 
 and  . Adding up these variables, we derive the expenditure prediction in line with the pro-
posed regressions—the dashed line gives its plot. Please note that local elections were held in 
mid-December of the following years: 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, and 1993. The vertical solid line 
segments between those two lines stress the estimated pre-electoral upward jumps in investment. 
The jumps are higher when the incumbent did not run for re-election, which (in Viana do Alen-
tejo) happened in 1979 and 1993.
2 3
38 The structural break is visible in two ways: lower jumps in 
the last two tenures and the marked 1986 rise in the dependent variable. 
 
36 The predicted proportional change in y is not exactly equal to   because   is a discrete variable. The same ap-




37 The choice of municipality is immaterial. Viana do Alentejo is located in the Alentejo province—southern Portu-
gal. 
38 Contrast the 31 per cent jump of 1979 with the 12 per cent deviations in 1982 and 1985, and the 9 per cent jump 
of 1993 with the 4 per cent deviation in 1989.   20
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Chart 2—The political expenditure cycle in the municipality of Viana do Alentejo 
  The statistical significance of the PBCs was also investigated. Firstly, we tested for the 
joint significance of both propositions. This requires the estimation of a constrained model, de-
rived from the original by imposing the nulls. Columns 4 and 5 in Table 1 present its estimates 
for the first and the second sub-samples, respectively. For each one, the statistical significance of 
the difference between the unrestricted and the constrained models is judged upon the value of 
the relevant F-statistic, which equals 8.799 in 1977–85 and 13.531 in 1986–93. In both cases, the 
data do not reject the overall explanation of investment cycles put forward in Section 3. 
  Secondly, we have also looked for the individual significance of each proposition. As 
there are two empirical implications springing from Proposition 2, its test requires i) a simple t-
ratio analysis of   in columns 2 and 3 above, and ii) a comparison between the unrestricted 




02 3 . Note 
therefore that β2 in columns 2 and 3 is significantly non-zero. The coefficient of determination 
of the constrained model (not shown) is 0.371 for the 1977–85 sub-period and 0.513 for the 
1986–93 sub-period; they entail F-statistics of 3.275 and 27.099, respectively, thus allowing us 
to reject the null in both cases—with a 90 per cent confidence level in the first case and 99 per 
cent in the second. So the two empirical implications of Proposition 2 pass the data test in both 
sample periods. To test for Proposition 3’s empirical implication alone, it suffices to look for the 
individual significance of β3 in columns 2 and 3. Although portraying an economically sound 
estimate in both sub-periods, this proposition finds statistical support in 1986–93 only. As sug-
gested above, the weaker performance in the earlier sub-period is probably due to the democ-
racy-learning process. 
β β + =  21
****** 
  The empirical findings in this section associate economic plausibility with statistical sig-
nificance, and two conclusions clearly emerge. On the one hand, Propositions 2 and 3 are fully 
supported by the results in column 3 of Table 1, thus revealing an actual case where the political 
business cycle rationale put forward in Section 3 is empirically relevant. On the other, the avail-
able data point out a diachronic structural break: participation in the common regional policy 
from 1986 onwards may have led to a mitigation of the PBC and a reinforcement of the explana-
tory power of capital transfers. 
6 Concluding  Remarks 
  Conventional views about opportunistic PBCs often ascribe their origin to the electorate’s 
shortsightedness or the incumbent’s desire for being re-elected. In this paper, we suggest a quite 
different interpretation. PBCs can indeed be the optimal outcome of an ultrarational set-up 
where information is full and symmetrically distributed, all players optimise, voters are forward-
lookers and the current incumbent explicitly allows for her satisfaction in the two possible future 
states of nature: electoral victory and electoral defeat. To the extent that the analysis addresses 
how the voting institution aligns people’s preferences with the incentives of self-interested poli-
ticians, the paper is very much in the spirit of the on-going literature on the micropolitical foun-
dations of public finance analysis—see Persson et al. (1998). 
  The theoretical framework points out three predictions. First, the expenditure profile is 
time-consistent regardless of who wins the following elections; indeed, the optimal solution cor-
responds to the (unique) sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of a game played by successive ad-
ministrations. Secondly, the optimal policy is a PBC where public outlays before elections ex-
ceed those after elections. The incumbent’s pre-electoral utility is totally derived from being in 
office whereas her post-electoral utility is contingent upon the electoral score; hence, considera-
tion for the possibility of defeat (or no re-candidacy) and the concomitant alternative employ-
ment introduces an asymmetry in the way pre- and post-electoral expenditure levels are set and 
engenders the cycle. Thirdly, a decrease in the (exogenous) re-election probability does not nar-
row the expenditure cycle. This is so because the incumbent’s pre-electoral utility becomes rela-
tively more important following the probability shock. 
  We believe the theoretical framework is particularly suited for explaining PBCs at the 
local government tier. Thus, the paper has also provided an empirical test to the proposed ration-
ale, based on a panel data sample of Portuguese municipalities. Municipal investment expendi-
ture was the endogenous variable over which political cycles were expected to materialise. The 
empirical evidence in the period 1986–1993 seems to support the theoretical model, as its predic-
tions were not contradicted by the data. 
  So, public expenditure fluctuations can be interpreted as the outcome of rational behav-
iour by fully informed agents. Inasmuch as these fluctuations are regarded as detrimental to soci-
ety, our research motivates a future study on incentive design to minimise their occurrence.   22
 Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: Problem (8) is the recursive solution to the successive static optimisa-
tion problems stated in Subsection 3.2. Each static problem can be viewed as a sub-game of a 
game played by two consecutive administrations. Note that only one action is possible at each 
moment and that the optimal solution to each static problem is unique; hence, the game at issue 
belongs to the class of finite games of perfect information. By Zermelo’s theorem, we are told 
that: i) there is a unique Nash equilibrium for the intertemporal fiscal policy game; ii) this equi-
librium outcome can be derived through backward induction. Moreover, as with every game in 
that class, ours has a unique pure strategy sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium—according to 
proposition 9.B.2. in Mas-Collel et al. (1995, p. 276). Consequently, the strategy profile derived 
by backward induction in Subsection 3.2 identifies the Nash equilibrium for both the whole 
game and each associated sub-game.    
Proof of Proposition 2: A three-step approach is used to establish the thesis. First, the very exis-
tence of an optimal solution is ensured; secondly, the necessity of the first-order condition to de-
scribe optimising behaviour is asserted; finally, the specific cycle   will be derived as an 
implication of the first-order condition. 
g 05 > . 1
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is the opportunity set. Clearly, E is a non-empty and compact set in  . The objective function 
is continuous in this set as it is arithmetically built from the continuous function defined therein. 
Hence, the Weiertrass’s theorem applies. Moreover, the optimal solution is unique because the 
objective function is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave in that domain. 
ℜ
2
(ii)  Necessity of the first-order condition: condition (9) is necessary to characterise local ex-
trema because both the objective and the constraint are C
2
g 05 > .
g 05 ≤ .
1 1 g
-functions and the relevant rank con-
dition is obviously met. 
(iii)  Expenditure cycle: from (i) and (ii) above, we know that a utility maximising basket ex-
ists, is unique and verifies (9). We will show now that the optimal solution implies   by 
contradiction. Suppose  . Then, 
1
1
     ′ ≥ ′ −> ′ − vg v g s v g 11 1 b g bg b π()  23
because  ,   and  ′ > v 0 ′′ < v 0 π() s <1. Hence, 
  ,   ′ − ′ −> vg s v g 1 1 bg b g π() 1 0
i.e., the left-hand side of (9) is strictly positive. By the same token, w  and  ′ > 0 ′′ < w 0 imply 
. Since  , the right-hand side of (9) is non-positive—hence a contra-
diction is generated when  . Therefore,   in the maximising basket.    
′ − ′ −≥ wg w g 11 10 bg b g Ω<0
05 ≤ . g1 g1 05 > .
Generalization to multiple periods: The incumbent’s utility function (2) can be understood as a 
reduced version of the multi-period utility function governing the incumbent’s behaviour. The 
reduced version gains in simplicity at the cost of omitting terms that do not qualitatively affect 
the results. To see this, consider the utility function at the beginning of a budget cycle, 
  uv g v g x y u u =+ + − + + − 12 11 bg bg ππ π () ( ) () π    , 
where  u  and u represent the utility of starting the new budget cycle (after period 2) in office 
and in opposition, respectively. Similar to the hypothesis  , let  vg xy 2 > () bg u —we thereby 
reiterate the assumption that the politician prefers to start the new budget cycle as the incumbent. 
Rewriting the above equation as 
u >
  uv g v g x y x y uu u =+ −+ + − + 12 b g b g b g ππ () ()  
allows for a simplification. The term π vg xy 2 b g− ( )  is qualitatively analogous to π uu − b g as 
far as the incentives for setting   and   are concerned. To see this, note that winning the elec-
tion is then desirable not only because being in office yields more utility during period 2—which 
is captured by the term 
g g 1 2
π vg xy 2 b ( ) g− —but also because the politician prefers to start the new 
budget cycle as the incumbent—as captured by the term  . Thus, ignoring the terms as-
sociated with the distant (post-period 2) future does not qualitatively affect the incentives driving 
the results. In the main text, we ignore these terms without loss of generality—for the purpose of 
studying cycles’ amplitude as a function of behavioural parameters—and make considerable 
gains in simplicity. 
π uu − b g
Proof of Proposition 3: Firstly, we will derive the bordered hessian determinant associated with 
the incumbent’s problem. Secondly, the expression for dg d 1 π  will be obtained out of the total 
differentiation of the first-order condition. The sign of this expression follows from that determi-
nant. 
(i)  The bordered hessian determinant inherent to the incumbent’s problem (11) is (interior 
solutions only)   24
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where   (ij ) denotes the second-order partial derivatives of the auxiliary lagrangean 
function: 
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   . 
  We are interested in evaluating  H  at the stationary point, which naturally complies with 
the budget constraint  . After some rearrangements, the expression of the determinant 
becomes 
gg 1 1 =− 2
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   ,   
where the strict positiveness follows from the strict quasi-concavity of the objective function in 
problem (8). 
(ii)  We now derive dg d 1 π . Total differentiation of the first-order condition (9), p. 10, with 
respect to   and  g1  leads to  π
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11 1 = ′ − ′ − b g b g   ,   
by definition of s and the budget constraint. Inserting these individual derivatives into the total 
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where 
  Av g x y w g w g ≡ ′ −+ ′′ ′ − ′ − 11 11 b g b g b g 1  
 
Bvg v g wg w g
vgx x yx y w gw g
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  Cw g w ≡− ′′ − ′ − 21 11 γ b g b g g    . 
  Now note that BC A += − H . Therefore, B CA + < 0
A ≥ 0
. Moreover, A is simply the left-






≤    , 
which concludes the proof.    
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